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Abstract: Presentism is roughly the view that only the present exists.  This view requires an 
absolute simultaneity relation.  The special theory of relativity, however, is highly successful and 
does not account for absolute simultaneity.  This is widely regarded as an evidential threat to 
presentism.  In what follows, I propose a modest evidential argument in support of presentism on 
the basis of the physical evidence itself.  A weak relativity postulate is shown to follow from a 
weak light-speed postulate.  The weak light-speed postulate, in turn, is shown to be more 
probable on presentism than on its main rival doctrine, eternalism.  Specifically, when one 
accounts for possible worlds in which the space-time metric is Euclidean (+,+,+,+) rather than 
Lorentzian (-,+,+,+), the empirical evidence turns out to be more probable on presentism than on 
eternalism.  If successful, this argument provides modest evidential support for presentism and 
against eternalism.  However, the support is drawn from an unexpected source: the physical 
evidence itself. 
 
Introduction 
 Presentism is roughly the view that only the present exists.  Hilary Putnam suggests this 
is likely the view of the “man on the street.”2  To see why, note that events within time may be 
described individually as past, present, or future.  This description involves individual tensed 
properties.  Since events in daily life are commonly described using tensed language, one might 
take it for granted that time is tensed and that tensed language is appropriate.  Events may also be 
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described in relation to each other using terms like “before” and “after”.  This description makes 
no reference to the present moment and is therefore tenseless.  McTaggart’s paradox, however, 
demonstrates that events cannot be arranged in both tensed and tenseless series since “this would 
require of any event e that it is both present and future, and this is contradictory.”3  If one wishes 
to maintain that tense is real—the common sense view—then one simply denies that past and 
future events exist.
4
  So it is that a common sense view of tenses (plus McTaggart’s paradox) 
entails presentism.  Of course, one could instead reject tenses.  Rejecting tenses (plus 
McTaggart’s paradox) entails eternalism, the view that all events are equally real and that tense 
is illusory. 
 Presentism faces several challenges despite this common sense support.  Ned Markosian 
identifies four such challenges, three of which are conundrums involving non-present (and 
therefore non-existent) objects and times.
5
  Markosian’s remaining challenge follows from the 
Special Theory of Relativity (STR).  Specifically,  
It is an apparently a consequence of that theory that there is no such thing as absolute 
simultaneity, and this suggests that which things are present is a relativistic matter that 
can vary from one reference frame to another.  This in turn suggests that the Presentist is 
committed to the claim that what exists is a relativistic matter, so that it may well be the 
case that Socrates exists relative to your frame of reference but does not exist relative to 
my frame of reference.  This would surely be an untenable consequence of the view.
 6
 
 
Markosian addresses the challenge from STR by asking, “Does STR have enough philosophical 
baggage built into it to make it either literally contain or at least entail that there is no such thing 
as absolute simultaneity?”7  If so, then Markosian rejects the theory (calling it STR+) on account 
of its philosophical baggage.  If not, then the “philosophically austere” theory (called STR-) does 
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not rule out presentism.
8
  Notably, Markosian recognizes that any threat to presentism arises 
from the philosophical rather than physical-empirical component of STR.  The strictly empirical 
evidence “is consistent with there being such a relation as absolute simultaneity.”9 
 Accordingly, William Lane Craig (a defender of presentism) proposes an empirically 
adequate version of STR that is fully compatible with absolute simultaneity: neo-Lorentzian 
relativity.
10
  Mere compatibility, however, does not impress the skeptic.  Regarding Craig’s 
proposal, Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen suggest,  
the physical evidence militates against such a return to the days before Einstein … [T]he 
argument from physics against Craig’s metaphysically-motivated proposal is on a par 
with the argument against proposals to return to the days before Darwin in biology or the 
days before Copernicus in astronomy.
11
 
 
They then proceed to appeal to certain philosophical virtues of their preferred version of STR—
the version normally articulated—that rule out absolute simultaneity.   
Rather than addressing these philosophical considerations directly, I would like to instead 
object to the claim that the physical evidence counts against presentist-friendly versions of STR.  
As I see it, the vast array of physical evidence supporting STR is reducible to confirmations of 
Einstein’s two postulates: the relativity postulate ( ) and the light-speed postulate ( ).  
Supposing, with Markosian and Craig, that both presentism ( ) and eternalism ( ) are 
empirically compatible with Einstein’s two postulates (  and  ), then the physical evidence must 
take a probabilistic form.  Specifically, one may assess the evidence in Bayesian form allowing 
that R and L may not be independent of each other:  
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Does physical evidence   and   lend support to philosophical view   or to philosophical view 
 ?  To find out, one must evaluate the two Bayes factors on the right hand side of the equation.  
Provided that their product is valued greater than one, then one may say that   and   count as 
evidence in favor of   and against  .12 
 In order to proceed, one must first ensure that propositions   and   represent the physical 
evidence without begging the question in favor of either   or  .  This requires careful 
reformulation of Einstein’s postulates in the “philosophically austere” form suggested by 
Markosian so as to not rule out absolute simultaneity (and presentism  ) a priori.13  This will be 
the first task below.  Following that, I will argue that   entails  —the relativity postulate is a 
natural consequence of the finite speed of light.  If so, then the first Bayes factor in Eq. (1) has a 
value of 1.  It then follows that the relevant empirical evidence is given by  .  I will then argue 
that   is more probable on   than on  .  Specifically, when one considers possible worlds in 
which the space-time metric is Euclidean (+,+,+,+) rather than Minkowskian (-,+,+,+) it becomes 
clear that presentist Euclidean worlds are not possible.  It follows from this that   is somewhat 
more probable on   than on   and therefore that the second Bayes factor in Eq. (1) is greater 
than one.   Given these two results, it follows that the strictly empirical evidence provides modest 
evidential support for presentism and against eternalism.  Although the support is modest, its 
source is unexpected: the physical evidence itself. 
 
The Philosophical Austere Physical Evidence 
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 STR is built on two postulates: the relativity postulate R and the light-speed postulate L.  
The present task is to find empirically adequate versions of these postulates that do not rule out 
absolute simultaneity (and presentism) a priori.  Using Markosian’s terminology, I need to 
identify the two postulates of STR
-
.  These postulates are weaker versions of their counterparts in 
STR
+
.  They claim enough to predict the physical evidence that supports STR yet  
not enough to rule out absolute simultaneity.  Therefore, anyone who accepts STR
+
 must also 
accept the weak postulates of STR
-
 along with other stronger beliefs they may hold about STR.   
There are two elements of STR
+
 (as it is normally articulated) that can be removed 
without any experimental consequences: the theoretical equivalence of all states of uniform 
motion
14
 and the isotropy of the speed of light.
15
  Let’s begin with the first element of this pair.  
The relativity postulate generally includes a claim to the effect that one cannot experimentally 
distinguish between two states of uniform motion.  Tim Budden coins this element “nautical 
relativity” in honor of Galileo’s famous ship illustration.  Below deck on Galileo’s ship, 
“repetitions of isolated experiments performed in different states of inertial motion yield the 
same results.”16  It doesn’t matter if the ship is sailing north, south, or standing still.  There is no 
experimental way to distinguish between different states of uniform motion from below deck.   
As mentioned above, STR
+
 tends involves the additional claim that all states of uniform 
motion are also theoretically identical.  Steven Savitt, for example, seems to understand the 
relativity postulate in this way.  If one singles out one observer as being at absolute rest, one 
would “hold the principle of relativity to be false … [thereby] rejecting special relativity in favor 
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of presentism rather than accommodating presentism in Minkowski spacetime.”17  Within STR-, 
however, one might instead follow Craig and suppose that different states of uniform motion 
have different absolute velocities.
18
  Indeed, on Galileo’s ship there is a fact of the matter as to 
whether the ship is sailing north, south, or standing still despite the ignorance of those below 
deck.  
Of course, one could easily tell below deck if the ship is turning or otherwise 
accelerating.  What accounts for this?  Steven Weinberg identifies two possibilities.  “Either we 
admit that there is a Newtonian absolute space-time, which defines the inertial frames and with 
respect to which typical galaxies happen to be at rest, or we must believe with Mach that inertia 
is due to an interaction with the average mass of the universe.”19  Weinberg recognizes that “the 
question of what determines these inertial frames was as mysterious after 1905 as in 1686.”20  
While the latter explanation has proven more popular, Geoffrey Builder
21
 and others have argued 
for the former explanation.  Accordingly, one may reserve judgment as to whether 
experimentally indistinguishable states of motion ought to also be theoretically equivalent.  
Given that freedom, one may articulate the relativity postulate   within STR- as follows: 
 : Within a closed system there is no physical means to distinguish between two states of 
uniform motion.   
 
Let’s now turn to the second empirically disposable element of STR+: the isotropy of the 
speed of light.  Normally, the light-speed postulate involves a claim to the effect that the speed of 
light is finite and independent of the motion of the light source.  That the speed of light is finite 
is uncontroversial.  That light behaves like a wave in a medium rather than like a projectile—its 
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speed is independent of its source—has been well established by experimental comparison with 
emission theories of light, such as those of W. Ritz.
22
  However, STR
+
 proponents tend to further 
assert that the speed of light is also isotropic—light travels at the same speed in every direction.   
The speed of light is intimately related to the question of distant simultaneity.  Both are 
arguably conventional in nature.  Ronald Anderson and Geoffrey Stedman explain this well. 
In order to synchronize spatially separated clocks, signals must be sent between them and 
the time of passage of such signals must be known … But we are caught in a circle here, 
as the time of passage for first signals can only be obtained by prior knowledge of the 
synchronization of clocks. The essence of the “conventionalist” position is that this 
circularity is inescapable and that no fact of nature permits a unique determination of 
either the simultaneity relation within an inertial frame or the speed of light in a given 
direction.
23
 
 
Of course, if a signal is sent on a “round-trip” then only one clock is required to measure the time 
of the journey; no synchronization is required.  The “one-way” speed of light, however, is always 
underdetermined by the experimental evidence.   
 Anderson and Stedman propose “the conventionality in the choice of the simultaneity, 
and thus the one-way speed of light, can be seen as a ‘local gauge transformation’.”24  Suppose 
that the speed of light is isotropic with a value of   in coordinate system (     ).  Anderson and 
Stedman show that under the following synchrony gauge transformation (where   is a function 
of spatial position  ), 
                    
    
 
    (2)  
the one-way speed of light in the direction  ̂ at point   is given by,25 
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From the form of this equation, it is clear that “the average of the one-way speeds of light in 
opposite directions is simply equal to  .”26  Anderson and Stedman further demonstrate that the 
average speed of light traveling around any closed loop with the anisotropic velocity given by 
Eq. (3) will always be  .27  This gauge freedom is further explored by E. Minguzzi who writes, 
Both [simultaneity and electrodynamics] have the mathematical structure of a gauge 
theory over a one-dimensional group … Other analogies, like that between the Sagnac 
effect and the Aharonov-Bohm effect, or like that between magnetic forces and the 
Coriolis forces, become self evident in light of the gauge interpretation.
28
 
 
 In summary, the one-way speed of light is a function of clock synchronization and vice-
versa—both are gauge dependent.  As such, one cannot directly test for the one-way speed of 
light any more than one can “test for the absolute zero voltage in seawater” since the one-way 
speed of light—like electric potential—is gauge dependent.29  Accordingly, we may adopt the 
following light-speed postulate as part of STR
- 
: 
 : There exists a frame of reference in which the speed of light has a finite round-trip 
average speed of  , independent of the motion of its source. 
 
 
The Relevant Evidence: Light-speed 
 We have articulated   and   within STR- in a manner that does not rule out absolute 
simultaneity a priori.  The next task is to evaluate the first Bayes factor in Eq. (1).  We need to 
compare the values of   (     ) to   (     ).  Namely, what is the probability that the 
relativity postulate would be true given the light-speed postulate plus presentism (or plus 
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eternalism)?   I will argue that the light-speed postulate entails the relativity postulate, namely 
  (   )   .  Since   and   are compatible with   and  , given their philosophically austere 
formulation, it then follows that   (     )    (     )   .  Therefore the first Bayes factor 
in Eq. (1) is also equal to one.  
The view that   entails   is not new.  Simon J. Prokhovnik argues the relativistic effects 
of length contraction and time dilation “are by no means independent and that both may in fact 
be consequential on a single more fundamental concept.”30  For Prokhovnik, the fundamental 
concept of interest is the postulated existence of “a basic inertial system … relative to which 
electromagnetic propagation is isotropic with velocity c.”31  Prokhovnik calls this system an 
“aether”, although the philosophical and historical baggage associated with that term need not 
detain us here.  It turns out that   as articulated above entails the existence of at least one such 
system.  Although   does not require isotropic light propagation, Ettore Minguzzi and Alan 
Macdonald demonstrate that the truth of   is sufficient for one to synchronize clocks such that 
light propagates isotropically.
32
  As such, we may regard   as practically equivalent to 
Prokhovnik’s “fundamental concept” from which length contraction and time-dilation may be 
derived. 
Prokhovnik begins by showing that if one assumes both   and the relativistic length 
contraction of moving bodies, then simple clocks will run slower by the precise amount expected 
for time-dilation.  Therefore, “It is the measurement of time which is effected by motion, the 
effect resulting from the interplay of two phenomena—the Fitzgerald [length] contraction and 
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the anisotropy of light propagation relative to a moving body.”33  He then goes on to discuss an 
argument by J. Bastin that inverse-square force laws, such as gravitation and electromagnetism, 
are modified by motion so that “a moving system of particles would require a clustering of the 
particles in the direction of motion in order to maintain the equilibrium state of the forces within 
the system.”34 An object boosted into motion smoothly (rather than merely observed by different 
observers) will therefore experience a real Lorentz contraction.  This point is also described very 
well by Carlos Barceló and Gil Jannes.   They demonstrate using condensed matter systems how 
an observer internal to the system cannot detect absolute motion with respect to the medium 
through which they travel.
35
 
Given the fact that   entails length contraction and the slowing of physical clocks, it is a 
simple task to show that   also holds.  Herman Erlichson, for example, identifies two alternative 
derivations of STR: the Lorentz Theory A (LTA) and the Lorentz Theory B (LTB).
36
  On the 
LTA, one assumes an ether, length contraction, and time dilation and then derives the Lorentz 
transformation equations and the relativity principle.  We have seen above that   may be 
construed (for practical purposes) as an ether hypothesis and that it entails length contraction and 
time dilation.  It follows that   entails  . 
It is also fruitful to consider Erlichson’s LTB.37  In this case, an ether is hypothesized and 
the covariance of Maxwell’s equations is assumed.  One then derives the Lorentz transformations 
and in turn the relativistic effects of length contraction and clock retardation.   It turns out that   
is sufficient to support an LTB-style approach to  .  We have seen that if   is true then one can 
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additionally render the speed of light isotropic through a careful choice of simultaneity gauge.
38
  
However,   virtually entails that light signals must obey a wave-equation given their independent 
isotropic propagation.  The wave-equation, however, is necessarily covariant under Lorentz 
transformations.  The Lorentz transformations and relativity principle therefore also follow from 
  via Erlichson’s LTB.  Therefore, since   (   )   , Eq. (1) simplifies as follows:  
 
  (     )
  (     )
 
  (   )
  (   )
 
  ( )
  ( )
 (4)  
 
Light-speed and the Space-time Metric 
The remaining task is to show that   (   )     (   ), namely that the philosophically 
austere light-speed postulate   is more likely to be true given presentism than given eternalism.  
In order to estimate these two probabilities, let’s consider three classes of possible worlds 
potentially available to presentism and eternalism: Minkowski space-time, Galilean space-time, 
and Euclidean space-time.  These space-times have different metrics and therefore different—yet 
analogous—electrodynamics.  One may formulate electrodynamics on all three types of space-
time without inconsistency.  Of course, electrodynamics as we observe it clearly indicates that 
the actual world is Minkowskian—the space time metric has the signature (-,+,+,+).  We, 
however, are interested in what sort of world we should expect given the truth of presentism or 
eternalism, not immediately in what sort of world we actually inhabit.  Let’s discuss these three 
classes of possible worlds in turn. 
First, we see that a Minkowskian world, such as our own, is compatible with both 
presentism and eternalism—hence the need for evidential arguments.  In such a world L holds 
since Minkowskian electromagnetic waves travel with a finite velocity independent of the 
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motion of their source.  The round-trip light-speed is constant since it is possible to choose 
coordinates such that the metric is made diagonal and the one-way speed of light is set to  .   
Second, a Galilean world is one in which the speed of light is instantaneous and therefore 
  does not hold.  In such a world Maxwell’s equations become invariant under the Galilean 
rather than Lorentz transformations.
39
  Of course,   holds in Galilean electrodynamics although 
one is able to clearly identify relations of absolute simultaneity—recall Galileo’s ship.  Absolute 
simultaneity is necessary but not sufficient to establish presentism.  Therefore, such a world is 
compatible with both presentism and eternalism.
40
  
Third, a Euclidean world is one in which the space-time metric is (+,+,+,+) rather than 
the (-,+,+,+) that we in fact observe.  Euclidean space-time is rarely discussed since our world is 
demonstrably not a Euclidean one.  Nevertheless, electrodynamics may be formulated in 
Euclidean space-time analogously to the formulation in Minkowski or Galilean space-time.
41
  In 
a Euclidean world, the interaction between electric charges and currents is not mediated by 
signals travelling with a finite velocity and therefore   is does not hold.  Rather, every event is 
causally connected to every other event.
42
  Euclidean electrodynamics is essentially a four-
dimensional analog of three-dimensional electrostatics and magnetostatics—the wave equation 
takes an elliptical form.
43
  Once again,   is satisfied without   in Euclidean space-time since the 
equations are invariant under rotations in Euclidean four-space.
44
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Euclidean space-time differs from Galilean and Minkowskian space time is one important 
respect: it is incompatible with presentism.  In a presentist Euclidean space-time, present events 
that exist stand in symmetric causal relations with future events that do not yet exist (and with 
past events that no longer exist).  One may contrast this situation with a Galilean world in which 
any two present events mutually influence each other by virtue of instantaneous electromagnetic 
interactions.  In the Galilean presentist case, both events exist.  Not so in the Euclidean case 
where all events influence all other events symmetrically without any regard for which events 
exist.  Of course, in a presentist Minkowski space-time presently existing events stand in causal 
relations with non-existent events on their past and future light-cones.  However, these relations 
are not symmetrical: two events cannot both lie on the others’ future light cone (or both on the 
others’ past light cone).  The causal symmetry between existing and non-existing events is the 
root of the problem for presentist Euclidean space-time. On this basis, I take it that there are no 
possible worlds in which presentism and Euclidean space-time both are true.   
Let ,  , and   represent the propositions that the world is Minkowskian, Galilean, and 
Euclidean respectively.  Based on the considerations above, we may write   (   )   , 
  (   )   ,   (   )   , and   (   )   .  It follows that,  
 
  (   )    (     )   (   )    (     )   (   )
   (     )   (   ) 
   (   )  
(5)  
In the case of eternalism, 
 
  (   )    (     )   (   )    (     )   (   )
   (     )   (   ) 
   (   )  
(6)  
If we take the possible worlds to be Minkowskian, Galilean, or Euclidean then we may write, 
     (   )    (   )  (7)  
and also, 
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     (   )    (   )    (   )  (8)  
As such, 
 
  (   )
  (   )
 
  (   )
  (   )
 
    (   )
    (   )    (   )
  (9)  
The question here becomes, “how likely are Minkowskian, Galilean, and Euclidean 
space-times on presentism and eternalism?”  Here we must be careful to avoid introducing 
further background knowledge from the actual world.  Supposing that the possible space-times 
are equally probable on   or  , with the exception of Euclidean presentist worlds, then we have: 
 
 
  (   )
  (   )
 
 
 
  (10)  
More conservatively, it is clear that any probability   (   ) of a Euclidean eternalist space-time 
detracts somewhat from the likelihood of eternalism given the experimental evidence.  Given a 
four-dimensional eternalist world, why think that such a world is not likely to be Euclidean?  I 
can’t think of a comparable reason to the one offered above against the possibility of presentist 
Euclidean worlds. 
 Concerning the probability of a Galilean world, it would be a mistake to think that 
  (   ) is particularly low or that   (   ) is particularly high in order to escape this evidential 
argument.  William Craig and Quentin Smith note that the absolute simultaneity of Galilean 
space-time poses no threat to eternalist interpretations of that space-time.
45
  Galilean space-time 
is not necessarily more likely on presentism than eternalism.  Rather, it is the perceived 
evidential weight of Minkowski space-time in favor of eternalism that may lead one to suppose 
that Galilean space-time is the de facto ally of the presentist.  The purpose of this argument has 
been to challenge and correct that perception.  Therefore, if the argument above is successful, 
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then we have good reason to take the second Bayes factor in Eq. (1) to be greater than one.  It 
then follows that physical evidence lends modest support to presentism rather than eternalism. 
 
Application: Potential Responses to Four Objections 
 The evidential argument presented above sheds light on various objections to presentism 
motivated by STR.  In what remains I will offer brief (non-rigorous) responses to four such 
objections.  The first is the so called “conspiracy of nature objection” to presentism.  On this 
objection, the objector recognizes both that absolute simultaneity is a necessary condition for 
presentism and that nature does not permit the detection of absolute simultaneity relations.  The 
presentist likely agrees with this.  The objector then offers a dilemma.  Either nature is fine-tuned 
to hide absolute simultaneity relations
46
 or they don’t exist.  The former is implausible, hence the 
distain for a natural conspiracy, so the latter must be true.  Given the discussion above, however, 
it ought to be clear that absolute simultaneity relations are hidden as a consequence of the light-
speed postulate.  However, the light-speed postulate is highly qualitative and does not exhibit the 
typical features of fine-tuning.  The presentist is therefore free to reject the dilemma.  Indeed, on 
presentism instantaneous signals are a privilege, not a right.  As it happens,   ensures that 
simultaneity is gauge dependent.  No conspiracy of nature is necessary to hide absolute 
simultaneity; one merely needs   to be true. 
 The second objection is that absolute simultaneity is “otiose”—a “free rider in the 
theory”—and should therefore be removed from any reasonable interpretation of STR.47  This 
may also be construed as an appeal to the supposed ontological parsimony of STR
+
.  Thomas 
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Crisp points out, however, that the eternalist “postulates a vast realm of past and future entities 
not postulated by the presentist.”48  Perhaps these entities, rather than absolute simultaneity, 
ought to be shaved off of the theory.  Which entities hold greater explanatory power over the 
physical evidence?  In the argument presented above we have seen that the empirical evidence   
and   is more probable on presentism than on eternalism.  Furthermore, since explanatory power 
can also be expressed in Bayesian terms, one may restate the results above in terms of 
explanatory power.
49
  Specifically, since   entails  ,   explains  .  Furthermore, since   is more 
probable on   than on  ,   is better explained by   than by  .  Since presentism holds greater 
explanatory power over   and  , perhaps it is the “vast realm of past and future entities”50 rather 
than absolute simultaneity that deserves to be described as otiose. 
An alternate form of this objection is pressed by those who deny the conventionality of 
simultaneity, often citing David Malament’s famous result.51  It is important to realize that the 
significance of Malament’s result within the conventionality debate is both contested52 and 
irrelevant to the argument presented above.  Suppose that Malament does succeed in arguing that 
only one simultaneity relation per observer is definable in terms of the causal structure of space-
time—a point not conceded by Adolf Grünbaum.53  The argument above merely uses the 
uncontroversial, demonstrable gauge freedom of simultaneity to formulate weak versions of the 
relativity and light-speed postulates.  No prior commitment is required to the significance of this 
                                                 
48
 Thomas M. Crisp, “Presentism, Eternalism and Relativity Physics,” in Einstein, Relativity and Absolute 
Simultaneity, ed. William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 270. 
49
 cf. Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger, “The Logic of Explanatory Power,” Philosophy of Science 78 
(January 2011): 105–127. 
50
 Crisp, “Presentism, Eternalism and Relativity Physics,”  70. 
51
 David Malament, “Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultaneity,” Noûs 11, no. 3 
(September 1, 1977): 293. 
52
 Anderson, Vetharaniam, and Stedman, “Conventionality of Synchronisation, Gauge Dependence and 
Test Theories of Relativity,” 1 1–126. 
53
 Adolf Grünbaum, “David Malament and the Conventionality of Simultaneity: A Reply,” Foundations of 
Physics 40, no. 9–10 (October 1, 2010): 1285–1297. 
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gauge freedom or as to whether any one simultaneity gauge is metaphysically preferred.  Once 
the argument goes through, however, one obtains evidential support for presentism and the 
absolute simultaneity that it entails.  This physical support counts as a reason to consider the 
possibility of simultaneity relations not defined by the causal structure of space-time.  
The third objection may be called the “coordination problem.”  Craig Callender argues 
that potential absolute simultaneity relations “preferred by quantum mechanics may not be 
[those] preferred by metaphysics.”54  Specifically, why think that any given physical absolute 
simultaneity relation is the same as the metaphysical relation entailed by presentism?  In the 
argument presented above, however, there is no need to identify any given physical simultaneity 
relation with the present of the presentist.  Rather, one may show that R entails L without either 
positing or ruling out absolute simultaneity of any sort.  Next, one may show that presentist 
Euclidean worlds are not possible by merely considering the presentist simultaneity relation of 
what exists “now”.  As such, the argument does not depend on a physical example of absolute 
simultaneity.  Therefore, Callender’s coordination problem may be left unsolved without 
undercutting this argument.   
The last objection may be called the “common origins objection.”  Balashov and Janssen 
suggests that on presentist interpretations of STR, such as Craig’s,55 
it is, in the final analysis, an unexplained coincidence that the laws governing different 
sorts of matter all share the property of Lorentz invariance, which originally appeared to 
be nothing but a peculiarity of the laws governing electromagnetic fields.  In the 
[eternalist] space-time interpretation this coincidence is explained by tracing the Lorentz 
invariance of all these different laws to a common origin: the space-time structure posited 
in this [eternalist] interpretation.
56
 
 
                                                 
54
 Craig Callender, “Finding ‘Real’ Time in Quantum Mechanics,” in Einstein, Relativity and Absolute 
Simultaneity, ed. William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 65. 
55
 Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. 
56
 Balashov and Janssen, “Critical Notice: Presentism and Relativity,”  41–342. 
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Put simply, “there are brute facts in [Craig’s] neo-Lorentzian interpretation that are explained in 
the [eternalist] space-time interpretation.”57  Balashov and Janssen therefore argue—counter to 
my claims above—that eternalism best explains the physical evidence and is therefore more 
probable on that evidence than presentism.  Among other things, our arguments differ over 
whether   entails  .  This is a critical difference since if   entails   then it is  —rather than  —
that is the relevant explanandum.  In order to generalize the argument presented above to account 
more clearly for non-electromagnetic systems one also would need to generalize the light-speed 
postulate.  In principle, this involves discussing non-Abelian gauge theories.  One must then 
argue that   also follows from a generalized  .  I propose doing so as follows.58   
Physical field theories involve interactions between locally conserved source currents 
through intermediary fields.  Supposing that no field interaction between sources is instantaneous 
(generalized  ), then observers will enjoy a conventionality/gauge freedom of simultaneity 
similar to that discussed above.  Via Noether’s theorem, an observer will be able to formulate a 
field theory describing the interactions between conserved source currents.   This is possible in 
any coordinate system in which the sources are observed to be locally conserved.  However, 
source conservation—like Doppler shift and aberration—is independent of what simultaneity 
gauge one chooses.  Therefore, observers in relative motion who agree that a given source 
current is conserved may use Noether’s theorem to formulate the same physical field theory in 
different coordinates.  Specifically, one cannot expect a breakdown of the Lorentz invariance of 
physical laws without a corresponding observed breakdown of the conservation of the source 
currents.  The finite speed of source interaction permits multiple equivalent formulations of the 
                                                 
57
 Ibid., 342.  
58
 Benjamin B. Nasmith, “Presentism in a World Denied Instantaneous Signals,” ( 011): [Preprint] URL: 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8836 (accessed 2013-03-02). 
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same field theory in different coordinates.  Therefore, a generalized   also entails  .  If this 
approach succeeds, the generalized   (rather than  ) becomes the proper explanandum of 
presentism and eternalism.  In light of the discussion above, a generalized   is also better 
explained by presentism than by eternalism.  Accordingly, the common origins objection need 
not trouble the presentist. 
20 
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